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introduction of the equal protection compelling interest requirements in
this area of the law and, accordingly, will not designate access to the
civil courts generally as a fundamental right.79 Such a course seems wise
to this writer. Government is not shackled with the command to achieve
the impossible goal of equality; yet the Court retains the option to
eliminate unfairness in specific areas where the burden on the indigent
is unreasonably heavy.
IRVIN WHITE HANKINS III
Employment Discrimination-Building Up the Headwinds
In 1971 the United States Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.' that a private employer's hiring practices violated the man-
date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Faced with a showing
of racially discriminatory impact without intent,3 a unanimous Court4
concluded that "employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups"5 were invalid ab-
sent proof of genuine "business necessity"' within the scope of the Title
"But see Note, Free Access to the Civil Courts as a Fundamental Constitutional Right: The
Waiving of Filing Fees for Indigents, 8 NEw ENG. REV. 275, 302 (1973). This note states the novel
proposition that since the Supreme Court did not specifically address the concept of access to the
courts generally, the designation of that concept as a fundamental right by the lower courts remains
intact.
1401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court invalidated Duke Power's requirement of a high school
diploma and satisfactory aptitude test scores for employment in all non-labor force departments.
The requirement was instituted, without a meaningful validation study, despite the successful
performance of non-high school graduates already employed in those departments.
2Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter cited as Act], §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (Supp. 1972). For pertinent portions of the Act see text accompanying note 18 infra. For
a recent analysis of the application of Title VII to hiring practices see Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1119-51 (1971).
'An analysis of the doctrine of unintentional discrimination is not within the scope of this
note. It is now generally accepted that intent is unnecessary for the establishment of a violation of
Title VII. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.) petition for cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). However, it is clear that an employment practice must have a discriminatory
impact to violate Title VII. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 326 F. Supp. 198, 202-03
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a detailed discussion of the ramifications of the Court's redefinition of
discrimination see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
'Mr. Justice Brennan did not participate.
'401 U.S. at 432.
'See notes 20-33 infra and accompanying text.
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VII Guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.7 Subsequently, both commentators and the lower federal
courts have been primarily concerned with the ramifications of Griggs
in the area of job testing.8 Recently in Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.,9
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the
racially discriminatory impact of certain "pre-employment" standards
utilized to screen applicants prior to job testing. However, in discarding
the rigid "business necessity" doctrine in favor of a more flexible "job-
related" standard, the court presented United and other employers in
analogous positions with a windfall of considerable proportions.
In May 1969, Paul Spurlock submitted an application to United
Airlines for employment as a flight officer. At the time he was twenty-
nine years of age, had completed two years of college, and had logged
204 hours of flight time. He thus fitted the composite flight officer
qualifications previously advertised by United.'" Nevertheless, United
rejected his application because it had recently increased the educational
and flight time requirements. 1 After increasing his total flight time to
five hundred hours, Spurlock reapplied and was again rejected. Suit was
filed under the enforcement provisions of Title VII 2 alleging that the
miniscule number of black flight officers (approximately nine out of a
total of 5900) established a prima facie case of racially discriminatory
hiring practices. 3 Spurlock did not seek admission to United's "rigor-
7Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1972).
'E.g., Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
474 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company:
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv.
844 (1972); Note, Intelligence Testing: Beyond Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 49 CiI.-KENT L.
REv. 82 (1972); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972).
'475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
"See Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Colo. 1971). United's
employment brochure set forth the following qualifications: a commercial pilot's license (generally
requiring 165-200 hours of flight time), two years of college (which could be waived for applicants
with equivalent experience and excellent qualifications) and excellent physical condition. Other
factors taken into consideration included flight aptitude, learning ability and temperament. Id.
"A memorandum circulated to the personnel department in April contained the following
guidelines for placing candidates into process: "(I) College degree; (2) 500 hours of flight time
(minimum); Commercial license and instrument rating; (4) Age 21 through 29." Id. at 229.
'2Act § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 1972).
3Sparse representation of a minority group within a workforce is a commonly accepted index
of discrimination. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.19 (1973);
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1172, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972) (small percentage of black
principals in New York city schools in comparison with other large metropolitan school systems);
cf Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (all white
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ous training course,"14 but merely claimed denial of an equal opportun-
ity to take the tests which United administered to select candidates for
the course. Relying on a less sweeping interpretation of the Griggs
opinion, the district court held that despite the prima facie discrimina-
tory impact, United's standards clearly had a "'manifest relationship
to the employment in question.' "15 This note will examine the implica-
tions that emanate from the failure of both the trial and appellate courts
to inquire into the feasibility of less discriminatory alternatives.
Of all the recent civil rights legislation, only Title VII appears to
have been directed at the economic aspects of minority group oppres-
sion."6 To improve the employment prospects of blacks, the Act has
outlawed discrimination, generally assumed to be the cause of the prob-
lem. 7 Section 703 of Title VII states: "[I]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire, to
discharge any individual . . or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive . . . any individual of employment opportunities . . because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. '"'8 Pres-
ently, Griggs is the only Supreme Court case in which testing devices
and educational requirements have been challenged as unfair hiring
practices. 9 In proscribing practices that were superficially neutral but
fire department in a city with a minority population of 6.4%). But see Allen v. City of Mobile,
466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972) (blacks comprised one third of city's population, but only 12.4% of
its police force). In Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), statistics showing 3.6% black policemen in a city with a 16.3%
black population were held to be "of no value in deciding which, if any, of the specific practices
referred to in the complaint are discriminatory . . . ." Id. at 936.
"4475 F.2d at 219.
"1330 F. Supp. 228, 235 (D. Colo. 1971), quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971).
642 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (1970); see Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1111-13.
"Note, 84 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 1113. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
"Act § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2(a) (Supp.
1972) (emphasis added). The 1972 amendment added "or applicants for employment" after "his
employees."
"There have been only three other Title VII decisions on the merits. Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), involved a challenge to a company rule against
hiring women with preschool-age children-men in like circumstances carried no such disability.
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), upheld an administrative procedure of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission concerning federal-state relations in the processing of Title
VII cases. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), upheld a rejected applicant's
right to sue subsequent to a finding by the EEOC of reasonable cause for the rejection. Further-
more, the Court held that refusal to hire an applicant because he had engaged in illegal activity
1973]
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discriminatory in operation, the Court introduced the now familiar
"business necessity" doctrine. "The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.""0
However, the Court's thematic approach" and its reluctance to define
precisely the concept of "business necessity" relegated the task of delin-
eating the scope of the doctrine to the lower federal courts.2 The only
assistance offered came in a casual remark that the interpretation of
Title VII contained in the EEOC Guidelines was entitled to "great
deference ' 2 3 as an expression of congressional will. 21 Under the present
Guidelines25 the use of a "test" 26 that has an adverse impact on the hiring
of minority group members constitutes a discriminatory employment
practice unless test validation2 7 demonstrates "a high degree of utility
• . . [and] alternative suitable hiring. . . procedures are unavailable for
use."28 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
Guidelines, attempts were made in early post-Griggs decisions to create
other validation standards.2 9 However, the Guidelines have recently
against the company was legitimate, absent proof of discriminatory application. Id. at 798, 806.
"'401 U.S. at 431.
21This technique, often used in opening new areas of the law, involves listing several factors
which affect the Court's decision, thus allowing the lower courts to determine the proper scope of
the new rule. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). For a
discussion of the thematic approach employed in Griggs, see Wilson, supra note 8, at 846.
1In addition to the language in the text accompanying note 20 supra, the Court elsewhere in
its opinion used such interrelated terminology as "significantly related," "genuine business need,"
and "manifest relationship." 401 U.S. at 426, 431-32.
"Id. at 434.
2 "The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable
procedures and regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter .... " Act § 713, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970). However, it is commonly accepted that the guidelines do not have
the force of law. See, e.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1972). An extensive discussion of the increased authority given to the
Commission by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 may be found in Comment, In
America, What You Do Is What You Are: The Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, 22
CATH. U.L. REv. 455 (1973).
2The Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1972), superseded
Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 1233 (1970).
2 Significantly, the Guidelines define the term "test" to include "all formal . . . techniques
of assessing job suitability including . . . background requirements [and] educational or work
history requirements .... " 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1972).
nThe minimum standards for test validation are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1972). For
a recent discussion of judicial response to test validation under the EEOC Guidelines, see Note,
Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for
Both Public and Private Employees, 41 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 505, 521-29 (1973).
-29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1972).
"E.g., Colbert v. H-K Corp., 4 FEP Cas. 529 (N.D. Ga. 1971), on remand from 444 F.2d
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gained general acceptance as the appropriate basis for resolving test
validation inquiry."0 Moreover, their influence has appeared elsewhere
as the courts have proceeded to recognize that some reasonable and
efficient employment practices, which engender widespread discrimina-
tory repercussions, are intolerable.3 1 Nonetheless, the Guidelines fail to
provide an explicit definition of the "business necessity" concept. The
most cogent judicial definition appears to be that which has evolved
from an amalgamation of the Guidelines and several appellate court
formulations:
32
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be suffi-
ciently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged prac-
tice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact.33
In Spurlock, the court premised its decision on the existence of a
heretofore unarticulated dual standard in Title VII litigation.
"Employment practices which are inherently discriminatory may never-
theless be valid if a business necessity can be shown. And pre-
employment qualifications which result in discrimination may be valid
if they are shown to be job-related."34 Despite the language of Title
VII, 5 the trend established by other courts 6 and forceful arguments
1381 (5th Cir. 1971). The court suggested that under Griggs "validity itself is a reasonable, not an
absolute requirement." Id. at 530.
"E.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albe-
marle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
3'This view has frequently been taken in cases involving seniority systems having discrimina-
tory impacts on black employees. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th
Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), noted in 50 N.C.L. REv.
1161 (1972).
310ne of the formulations happened to be that announced by the Tenth Circuit in Jones v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970): "When a policy is demonstrated
to have discriminatory effects, it can be justified only by a showing that it is necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business." (emphasis added).
"Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (footnotes omitted). See also United States
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972)
(management convenience not synonymous with business necessity).
31475 F.2d at 218 (emphasis added).
35See text accompanying note 18 supra.
3 See, e.g., cases cited notes 3 & 30 supra. Also, in Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490
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by commentators,3 7 United's requirements were analyzed within a job-
related context.
38
The court first concluded that United's statistical evidence clearly
showed that "500 hours was a reasonable minimum to require of appli-
cants to insure their ability to pass United's training program."3 Since
minimizing the program's cost constituted a "business necessity," the
standard was job-related." Superimposing the "business necessity" title
upon a "job-related" analysis appears only to expose and exacerbate the
latter's vulnerability to careful scrutiny. Even under its own relatively
primitive formulation of "business necessity," the court had required
proof that the policy was "essential to the safe, efficient operation of
the company's business."41 Moreover, simple statistical analysis reveals
that a lower cut-off point would be an equally reasonable alternative.4"
The court's position can be defended however, by recourse to quantita-
tive economic values. A higher cut-off point causes a proportionate
reduction in total expenditures by reducing the number of trainees nec-
essary to produce a given number of pilots.43 But there is a readily
discernable flaw that militates against complete reliance on this argu-
ment. Rejection of the lowest trainee groups not only eliminates half of
the failures, but also depletes the ranks of graduates by approximately
one-third. Consequently, as more applicants from the higher categories
are hired, the proportionate increase in failures from this group will
partially offset the reduction achieved by elimination of the lower appli-
cant groups.
(C.D. Cal. 1971), the court read Griggs to say that the only permissible factors to consider in
refusing to hire an employee were those directly affecting his ability to perform his job. Thus even
the job relatedness approach "leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance
or even expense to the employer." Id. at 495.
'7See Wilson, supra note 8, at 873 (academic records held to same standards as employment
tests); Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1142.
3'The court itself had previously recognized the hierarchy in standards. See Jones v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970).
3"475 F.2d at 216, 218-19 & n.l.
1"Id. at 219.
"Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970).
"The statistical significance of a difference between two groups can be determined using the
chi-square test of significance. In this case the null hypothesis is that the success rate is the same
for the two groups of trainees above and below a given cutoff point. Using both two hundred and
five hundred hours of flight time as cutoff points to be tested, the null hypothesis will be rejected
in both instances (at less than the .05% level) since the one percent and five percent levels are
commonly used in deciding whether to reject a null hypothesis. Thus the two cut off points appear
to be of equal statistical significance. See G.W. SNEDECOR & W. G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL
METHoDs 20-29, 215-19 (6th ed. 1968).
'475 F.2d at 219 n.l.
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With respect to the increased eduational requirement, the court
noted that "possession of a college degree indicated that the applicant
had the ability to understand and retain concepts and information given
in the atmosphere of a classroom training program."44 No inquiry was
made into the comparative value of the company's admission tests for
revealing the desired traits. Furthermore, the degree requirement was
apparently not considered dispositive since United willingly waived it
for applicants whd possessed extensive, high quality flight experience."
In reflecting on the purposes of Title VII, the Supreme Court in
Griggs took explicit judicial notice of the disparity between the educa-
tional levels of blacks and whites as being a consequence "directly trace-
able to race."4 Nevertheless, some courts have simply assumed that the
high school diploma requirement is valid.47 As one commentator has
noted:
The reluctance of courts to tamper with such requirements is
understandable, given the faith that American society has always re-
posed in education. But it ignores the substantial discriminatory im-
pact which educational requirements can have, without justification,
on minority group employment."
Today the disparity continues; it is even greater at the college level.49
The rate of black unemployment persists at double the rate for whites.5"
Recently, some courts, relying on these facts as well as Chief Justice
Burger's admonition against "using diplomas or degrees as fixed mea-
sures of capability," 5' have employed various formulations of the "busi-
ness necessity" concept to invalidate the high school diploma require-
ment. 2 By circumventing the strictures of this doctrine, the Tenth Cir-
"lid. at 219.
45Id.
11401 U.S. at 430. See the statistics used by the Court. Id. at 430 n.6.
"Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Services, 315 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Dobbins
v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 437-38 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
"Note, 84 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1143.
"Negroes comprise 11.2% of the total population, but only 6.0% of the total college enroll-
ment. 11.6% of whites over age twenty-five complete four years or more of college, compared with
4.5% of Negroes. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1971 27, 108, 128 (92d ed. 1971).
*,See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 104
(Aug. 1973).
11401 U.S. at 433.
2See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). However, the high school diploma
or its equivalent has survived rigid scrutiny as a requirement for metropolitan policemen. See, e.g.,
1973]
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cuit easily approved United's college degree requirement, since "a per-
son with a college degree is more able to cope with the initial training
program and the unending series of refresher courses than a person
without a college degree.""3 However, Spurlock fails to require the
presentation of any empirical evidence to substantiate the proposition
that a college graduate can better cope with the program than a non-
graduate of comparable intelligence. But the court apparently saw no
need for comparisons and consequently, did not even demand evidence
of a significant correlation between college graduation and successful
performance as a pilot, given the fact that an applicant had passed the
training program.
In conclusion, the court offered an explanation for the relative
lightness of United's burden of proof: the job of airline flight officer
"clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human
risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great. . . ."4 In
light of the facts in the case, this crucial syllogism appears to rest on
somewhat dubious logic at best. The court's description of the chal-
lenged requirements as "pre-employment" qualifications implicitly rec-
ognizes that they merely serve to determine which applicants may pro-
ceed to admissions testing.55 As the trial court noted, the plaintiff was
not demanding automatic employment because of his race, merely the
opportunity to take the tests." Assuming the training program was as
effective as the court's use of the term "rigorous" implies, only those
genuinely capable individuals would eventually become pilots. Thus the
"staggering" human and economic risks cited by the court57 appear to
involve merely those losses incurred because of applicants who enter but
fail to complete the training program. In light of the comparatively
diminutive "human" risk involved, the court's reasoning would seem
inappropriate unless United were able to demonstrate a "staggering"
economic risk involved in accepting less qualified applicants into its
training program.
Assuming arguendo the validity of the court's proposition, its con-
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972) (given two methods of adequate screening, the non-
discriminatory one must be used), cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973).
11475 F.2d at 219.
"Id.
-"See id. at 218.
"Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 228, 235 (D. Colo. 1971).
"See 475 F.2d at 219.
[Vol. 52
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clusion nevertheless remains vulnerable unless one accepts the propriety
of "selective extraction" as a means of legitimizing decisions. The court
appears guilty of this convenient practice upon examination of the
source of its proposition." The court's justification was extracted from
that portion of the Guidelines concerned with minimum standards for
validation of tests. 9 In effect, the court implicitly equated United's
requirements with tests in order to rationalize the application of a low-
ered evaluation standard, yet it completely ignored a preceding section
that enumerated additional criteria by which tests must be evaluated."
Had the court extended this tacit analogy to its logical dimensions,
United would have been required to show that suitable alternative hiring
procedures were "unavailable for its use.""1 Moreover, the court failed
to articulate reasons for ignoring the Guidelines' definition of the term
",test. 6
2
In defense of the court's conservative interpretation of Griggs, it
should be noted that Spurlock contains at least two substantial factual
variants. First, Griggs involved an archetype of the subordination of
black laborers in the South. 3 Obviously the circumstances in Spurlock
revolve on a more sophisticated level concomitant with the advanced
technology involved in United's business. Also, Duke Power had imple-
mented its requirements without a prior meaningful study of their rela-
tionship to successful job performance. 4 United, on the other hand, at
least offered statistical evidence to demonstrate "good faith"65 in raising
its requirements. These two factors perhaps prompted the trial court's
reiteration of Chief Justice Burger's caveat that Congress did not "com-
mand that any person be hired simply because. . . he is a member of
a minority group"66 nor that "the less qualified be preferred over the
"Id.
"'See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1972). The court drew its justification statement from 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)(2)(iii) (1972).
"See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1972).
6129 C.F.R. § 1607.3(b) (1972). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
"2See note 26 supra.
OSee 401 U.S. at 426-28.
'lid. at 431.
651n Handverger v. Harvill, 479 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1973), good faith was held to be a valid
defense to an allegation of deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). But cf Johnson
v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, (C.D. Cal. 1971) (good faith employment policy with discrimina-
tory consequences interdicted by Title VII).
6401 U.S. at 430-31, quoted with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 800 (1973).
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better qualified simply because of minority origins.""1
The Spurlock decision qualifies as an important precedent for a
sympathetic lower court response to the Burger Court's cautious ap-
proach toward enforcement of the constitutional rights of minorities. 8
Had the court seen fit to apply either a "business necessity" approach
or the standards provided by the EEOC Guidelines, United's task would
have been measurably greater. If the goals of Title VII are not to be
abandoned, the courts must carefully consider the availability of alter-
natives and the specific problems they themselves present, and weigh
these against the inequity of current hiring practices. If less discrimina-
tory alternatives are feasible the courts should be extremely reluctant
to condone existing discriminatory impacts. The "headwinds" against
minorities have not yet dissipated; the advanced technology and elevated
production standards of modern corporations should not blind the
courts to the portentous consequences of permitting employers to reject
qualified minority applicants merely because their white applicants are
"better" qualified.
SAXBY M. CHAPLIN
Estate Tax-Administrative Expense Deductions-
A Reaffirmation of the Section 2053(a)
Standard
The transfer of property at death results in the levy of federal estate
taxes upon the taxable estate, that is, the gross estate less allowable
deductions and exemptions.' One of the allowable deductions from the
gross estate is that of administration expenses provided for in section
2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 Treasury Regulations
6401 U.S. at 436.
"See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
21NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a) provides:
General Rule.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the
taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such
amounts-
(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortages on, or any indebtedness
[Vol. 52
